Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint · Franz Brentano. Routledge () Brentano and Wundt: Empirical and Experimental Bradford. Franz Brentano (). Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. I. The Concept and Purpose of Psychology. Source: Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. This standpoint is clearly mirrored in his empirical approach to psychology. It is noteworthy.
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint – Wikipedia
The Cambridge Companion to Freud. And just as botany can make accurate predictions, a sufficiently developed psychology must be able to do the same. This discussion shows that Brentano’s philosophy has strong psychologistic tendencies. Sometimes the processes are analogous to those in mechanics and sometimes to those in chemical reactions. He completed the first two books of the work in March When we depart from this life we separate ourselves from all that is subject to the laws of natural science.
According to Brentano, psychology plays a central role in the sciences; he considers especially logics, ethics, and rfanz as practical empigical that depend on psychology as their theoretical foundation.
Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint
Lotze agrees with Aristotle and Leibniz on this point, as does Herbert Spencer, among contemporary English empiricists. The Psychology of Aristotletransl.
Then I hear the third tone, now the second tone is modified as past, the first is pushed back even further into the past.
What has been said about the objects of external perception does not, however, apply in the qn way to objects of inner perception. Franz Clemens Brentano – – M. Mental Phenomena in General 1.
We, too, use the word “soul” in this sense. Indeed, they demonstrably do not exist outside of us.
We, therefore, define psychology as the science of mental phenomena, in the sense indicated above. Many of his students became professors all over the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Marty and Ehrenfels in Prague, Meinong in Graz, and Twardowski in Lvov now Lvivand so spread Brentanianism over the whole Austro-Hungarian Empire, which explains the central role of Brentano in the philosophical development in central Europe, especially in what was later called the Austrian Tradition in philosophy.
In some cases the intentional object does not exist, but even in these cases there is an object external to the mental act towards which we are directed. It shows that the results of our investigation are dependent on fewer presuppositions, and thus lends greater certainty to our convictions.
But even if this could not be established so clearly, we would still have to doubt their veracity because there would be no guarantee for them as long as the assumption that there is a world that exists in reality which causes our sensations and to which their content bears certain analogies, would be sufficient to account for the phenomena. We have advanced four reasons which appear to be sufficient to show the outstanding importance of the science of psychology: Intentionality in 19th Century Philosophy Brentano: And the question whether our mental life somehow continues even after the destruction of the body will be no more meaningless for him than for anyone else.
Brentano’s early metaphysics, which is the result of his critical reading of Aristotle, is a form of conceptualism. From the fact that up to now, for thousands standpoin years, psychology has made practically no progress, many would like to believe that they are justified in concluding with certainty that it will also do little in the psycholog to further the practical interests of mankind. The mature science would have to abandon the question of immortality, but we could say that, as consolation, the zealous efforts which stemmed from frabz desire for the impossible have led to the solution of other questions whose far-reaching significance cannot be called into question.
We see that the backward condition in which psychology has remained frsnz to be a necessity, even if we do not doubt the possibility of a rich development in the future. In order to make more intelligible the nature of psychology as he conceived it, John Stuart Mill, one of the most decisive and influential advocates of this point of view, has given in his System of Logic synopsis of the problems with which psychology must be stajdpoint.
The high theoretical value of psychological knowledge is obvious in still another respect. Brentano held that there are exact laws that refer only to the mental, and do not need to appeal to physical circumstances.
Without the use of psychology, the solicitude of the father as well as that of the political leader, remains an awkward groping. On the other hand, the first task mentioned above undoubtedly belongs to the physiologist.
At the same time, and in quite an analogous manner, the concept of life was also narrowed, or, if not this concept – for scientists still ordinarily use this term in its broad original sense – at least the concept brenatno the soul.
However, the results that Brentano produces from his method in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint have standpoijt described as “deadly dull and nearly vacuous. For the facts which the physiologist investigates and those which the psychologist investigates are most intimately correlated, despite their great differences in character.
Franz Brentano (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
On the contrary, of their existence we have that clear knowledge and complete certainty which is provided by immediate insight. But what entitles us to assume that there are such substances? The Theory of Categoriestransl. Its theory, I would like to suggest, will merely be a different arrangement and further development of psychological principles directed toward the attainment of a practical goal. In philosophy progress takes place in circles: In addition, judgments are correct or incorrect; they have a truth-value.
He distinguished between genetic and empirical or, as he later called frahz, descriptive psychology, a distinction that is most explicitly drawn in his Descriptive Psychology. Paul Vitzwho calls Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint Brentano’s greatest work, notes that while Brentano rejected the unconscious, “his answer followed largely from his definitions of consciousness and unconsciousness, and the evidence subsequently available to Freud did not, of course, figure in Brentano’s thought.
Likewise, at the present time in Germany no important thinker has expressed his rejection of a substantial substrate for both mental and physical states as often and as categorically as Theodor Fechner. As a matter of fact, in addition to the questions raised by Mill and those implicit in them, there are still others which are equally significant.
If that were so, every increase which is equal would have to be equally noticeable and every empirrical which is equally noticeable would have to be equal. According to Meinong, even non-existent objects are in some sense real. After some time empirica, influence was eclipsed by the work of his students, some of who founded philosophical traditions on their own: Brentano’s conception of these three disciplines is closely related to his distinction between the three kinds of mental phenomenon: